Do taxes matter? A review of the effect of taxation on economic behavior and output by Skinner, Jonathan
PlOV  R.an  K  andReemh
WORKING  PAPERS
World  Dwlopmnnt  Ret
Office  of  the  Vice  President
The  World  Bank
August  1989
WPS 48  V
Background  Paper  for the 1988  Wodd  Development  Report
Do  Taxes Matter?
A Review  of the Effect  of Taxation
on Economic  Behavior  and Output
Jonathan  Skinner
Taxes that are moderately distorting are potentially the most
damaging because their effects may be substantial yet go unno-
ticed.
The Policy, Planning, and Research Complex  distributes PPR Working Papers to disseninate the ftndings of work in progress and to
eneourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and aU  others interested in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the aut'ors, reflect only their views,  and should  be used and cited accordingly. The findings,  interpretations, and conclusions are the
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Taxpayers are most concemed about the private  trade, and consumption) while in other cases the
burden (costs) of taxation as measured by what  evidence is mixed (for example, in savings and
they pay to the government. However, taxes can  investment). In general, very low tax rates have
generate a net gain to society if governments use  little impact on economic behavior, while very
the revenues wisely.  Economists, on the other  high tax rates generate efficiency costs that
hand, are more concerned about the social  nobody can ignore.  However, when taxes are
burden (costs) of taxation independently of the  moderately distorting, they have the greatest
way in which the revenue is used. Taxes change  potential to damage as their welfare effects are
prices and factor returns (wage rates, the rate of  likely to be substantial but difficult to measure
return on capital, and so on).  When taxes are  quantitatively.
imposed, consumers and producers try to avo-
the tax by consuming or producing less of the  The latier half of the paper reviews the
taxed item (good, activity, or income).  The  literature on a more direct but narrower measure
extent of avoidance accelerates with increases in  of the incentive effects of taxation:  how do
the tax rate. This distortion of taxpayer behavior  taxes affect output growth rates?  Some new
reduces their welfare and results in a net  evidence on this issue is provided using a
("deadweight") loss to society when markets are  comprehensive sample of 111 countries.  Em-
functioning well.  pirical estimates from this cross-country data
show the growth rate of output to be negatively
To illustrate this broader welfare notion of  correlated with the level of government spend-
the economic inefficiency of taxation, some heu-  ing but positively correlated with the growth rate
*istic  examples are chosen, first from historical  of government spending.  Estimates of the effect
and then from more recent accounts.  It is shown  of tax rates on output growth rate are also
that in some cases the behavioral effect of taxa-  mixed: they are sometimes negative, sometimes
tion is dramatic (for example, in production,  zero.
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Taxpayers often view the primary burden of taxation to be the
amount they hand over to the tax collector.  The obvious cost of
taxatlon to the consumur is the lost income  and higher prices of
taxed gc,ods;  to producers it is the foregone profits and lower
after-tax product prices.  Throughout recorded history, cltizens
have registered their complaints against the taxes  they pay with
"murmurs and with smothered curses among them from  hatred of the
burden." 1
This paper will stress that the tax bill that taxpayers grumble
about --  the private cost --  has little to do with the full social
costs of the tax.  The reason is that from a social point of view,
money collected from the private sector is equal to the money galned
by the public sector (less administrative costs).  I' is certainly
possible that the government programs financed by this revenue, such
as education, health, or transportation,  will provide to the average
taxpayer the same, if not more, than the benefits that would have
been realized had the taxes never been collected.  To the extent
that the government uses the tax revenue wisely and effectively, the
loss of the private individual's tax payment can yield a greater
gain to society.  Of course, it is not surprising that taxpayers
seek to avoid paying taxes, since their payments will have little
effect on their own benefits from government spending.
iThe quotation is from a 15th century writer observing taxpayers'
reactions to the taille in England (Sabine, 1980; p. 55).This paper will focus primarily on a different type of cost.
Private citizens bear the burden of this cost of  taxation, but there
is no offsetting revenue gained by the government.  Wlthout the
offsetting gain, there is a "deadweight" cost to society as a whole.
These costs are in some sense abstract, and more difficult to
measure, but they are important because they reduce the well-being
of consumers or drag down the productive capability of the economy.
The goal of any tax system should be to minimize these costs, given
the revenue that the government must raise.
It is useful to categorize these six-tle  costs of taxation into
three groups.  The first is the effici&  ost of a tax.  Such
costs do not appear in government budget &"atements, but are costs
nevertheless.  They are caused by the distoition in taxpayer's
behavior caused by the tax-induced  changes in prices and wage rates.
For example, a payroll tax may discourage salaried work, and thereby
reduce the productivity of the labor force.  A tax on capital income
may reduce savings and hence investment.  Because the governmert
cannot collect any taxes on the foregone labor,-  or the foregone
savings, it loses revenue.  Because the individual no longer enjoys
the benefits of the wages from the foregone  work, or the proceeds of
the savings, he or she is worse off.  Hence the government loses
potential revenue and the taxpayer is worse off.
Another cost of taxation is the administrative, compliance, and
avoidance costs from collecting it.  Strictly speaking, the
administrative cost is observable; one need only check the yearly
budget to measure how much the government spends tc collect revenue.3
But administrative costs may be only a fraction of compliance costs
(accountants  hired to fill out tax forms) or avoidance costs (fast
boats and circuitous routes to smuggle goods into the country).
These latter two costs still represent "leakages"; the use of
otherwise productive resources in unproductive, tax avoidance or
compliance activities.
Costs may also be expended on bribery and other forms of direct
income transfer to avoid paying taxes.  While such activities do not
place a drain on resources 2.r  Al,  they do lead to a most
undesirable distribution of income away from the public treasury and
towards the more corrupt officials, and towards a general breakdown
of professional standards in tax administration.  It is important to
note that while corruption harms the economy, it does so in a way
which is different from the social costs discussed above.
The final cost of taxation relates primarily to the turmoil
which surrounds any change in the tax code.  Companies which are
unsure about future tax provisions may assume the worst and cancel
investment plans, despite the best intentions of the host country.
These are, once again, costs borne by taxpayers which yield no extra
revenue for the government.
One goal of this paper is to provide a partial review of the
deadweight or social costs of taxation.  The review is very
selective, and picks out readily apparent examples of deadweight
costs.  That is, it focuses on obvious examples or vignettes to
illustrate and enliven the usual abstract measures of efficiency
cost.  Another goal is to determine whether these "deadweight"  costsof taxation have an ultimate effect on national output.  In
particular, recent papers (Marsden, 1983; Landau, 1986; Skinner,
1988; Eigen and Skinner, 1989; Koester and Kormendi, 1988) have
stressed the negative impact of taxation on output growth rates.  A
sample of 111 countries is used to examine whether there are readily
apparent relationships between fiscal policy and output growth
rates.
Perhaps one reason why efficiency or "deadwelght" costs receive
little weight in policy discussions is because the notion of
efficiency cost is so abstract and difficult to quantify.  The next
section therefore draws on a simple example of commodity taxation to
illustrate what the efficiency cost is, and to distinguish It from
smuggling costs.  Section III provides a selective review of
efficiency cost, and in particular draws on historical examples for
illustrative purposes.  Section IV presents evidence on the
correlation between taxation and output growth rates, while Section
V concludes.
II.  Why Taxes Cause Efficiency Losses
Because economists have focused on efficiency as the guiding
principle for tax design, it is useful first to provide a simple
description of the efficiency cost of taxation.  I focus on one
example, that of a commodity tax on bicycles, but the r-inciples of
efficiency cost extend quite generaily to other types of taxes as
well.
Consider the case of the tariff on bicycles in a hypotheticaldeveloping country.  Assume that the before-ta  price of blcycles,
which must be imported, is $80.  The Import tariff in at least one
developing country is 70 percent, bringing the total price to $136.
I will araL  l  that farmer is willing to pay $80 for the
bicycle, but is unwilling to pay the rull $136 price.  In fact, this
farmer  will pay up to $100, but blanch at any price higher.
What is the efficiency cost of this tax?  It is quite easily
calculated.  Without the tax, the farmer would buy the bicycle for
$80.  Since he would have paid $100 for the same bicycle, he enjoys
a "consumer surplus" of $20; the excess of what the bicycle is worth
to him (i.e.,  what he would have paid) over the price actually paid.
When government imposes the 70 percent tax, the farmer no
longer purchases the bicycle, and no longer enjoys the "consumer
surplus" of $20.  The government collects no additional revenue (at
least from this potential taxpayer); since the bicycle is not
purchased, no taxes are paid.  The farmer loses $20 and the
government gains nothing.
This story which applies to only one individual can be
generalized to the countrywide market for bicycles.  Some will be
willing to spend more than $100 (or  even more than $136), while
others are willing to spend less.  We can array each individual
looking for a bicycle during the year as in Figure 1, with the
vertical height being the maximum each farmer is willing to pay
(i.e., the demand curve).  The numbers are based loosely on trade
data from one African country.
Assume 7000 bicycles will be sold without any tax.  If there is%xvv,  Jo6 
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a tax of 70 percent, then only those who value the bicycle above
$136 will buy it; assume this is a total of 4000 thousand.2 The
efficiency coth of the tax can be calculated in the following  way.
Assuming that each person only buys one bicycle, thare are 3
thousand individuals  who have been discouraged from buying a bicycle
because of the tax.  The  individual right at the margin of buying a
bicycle with the tax might have valued the bicycle at $135.98.
Hence his consumer loss is $135.98 - 80 - $55.98. or the consumer
surplus he would hM=  enjoye,  had there been no tax.  The next
individual aight value the bicycle at $135.96, so that his consumer
surplus would have been $55.96.  We may perform this calculation for
all the 3,000 individuals  who would have bought the bicycle.  The
sum of all the losses is the area of the triangle  denoted by BAD in
Figure 1.  The area of this triangle is measured by one-half the
amount of the tax ($56) tAmes the change in quantity demanded for
the product (3,000),  or $84,000.
The efficiency cost of $84,000 is a clear loss to society.  The
magnitude of this loss is more than one-third of the revenue (which
is $56x4000 =  $224,000).  What this means is that on average, every
$1.00 in revenue collected by the government causes a loss to
consumers of $1.33; $1.00 in the revenue actually paid plus $0.33 in
foregone "consumer surplus" from the enjoyment of a commodity which
would have been purchased had there been no tax.
The calculation reported above determined the averaae
2  The slope of the demand curve is therefore dQ/dP =  -53.6,
which is used in subsequent calculations.efficlency cost of the tax as  a  fraction of tVie  revenue.  A
different measure would be the sarainal effMciency cost; what is the
change in the efficiency cost if government revenue is increased by
a certain dollar amount.  For example, if the bicycle tax were
raised from 70 percent to 80 percent, the price would increase to
$144.  If, in turn, quantity demanded fell to 3,570, then the change
in revenue would be $4,480 ($228,480 - $224,000;  but the efficiency
cost would increase by $25,760 ($109,760 - $84,..-0). 'n this case,
the efficiency cost increase is more than  . tl-em the tax revenue
increase.  For the tax increase to be justified on efficiency
grounds,  each dollar spent must return more than $6 in social
benefits.
Finally, if there were smuggling of bicycles, the government
would find that not only would lower tariffs increase bicycle
purchases, but it also might reduce the amount of smuggling.
Shifting the importation  of bicycles from illegal to legal channels
may have little effect on the domestic use of bicycles, but it will
have a positive impact on the government's revenue.  For example,
when Bangladesh decreased its tax on fabrics from 200 to 100
percent, legally imported fabrics  more than doubled, so that revenue
actually increased.  It is unlikely, however, that domestic
consumption more th r.  doubled; what is more likely is that smuggled
fabrics became legally imported fabric,  which shifts income from
smugglers to the government.
Efficiency costs are present when producers are taxed.  The
most obvious examples of the deadweight or efficiency cost of a9
producer tax cameu from countries such as Tanzania and Ghana, where
heavy export taxatlon (either  lmplict  or expllclt) have squeezed
agricultural production, leading to a sharp fall in output, foreign
exchange earnings, and tax revenue (see the World DevgloDuent
; a22t, 1986).  Once again, producers lo*s because they are
producing less under the tax, but the government gain. no extra
revenue from the reduced production activity.  When export taxes
affect such an important component of the economy  (especially  once
the linkages  with the rest of the economy are accounted for), it
seems clear that the taxation of agricultural output caused a
substantial decline in national output.
One point should be made here.  In many socialistic countries,
there is little or no weight placed on "consumer surplus"; taxes
which discourage the use of, e.g., luxury or decadent capitalistic
goods are thought to be socially beneficial.  Such taxes prevent
citizens from placing private over social responsibilities.
However, even socialistic countries should avoid distortionary
producer taxes, since more (of the socially correct commodities) is
still preferred to less.3
These simple examples have provided illustrations of the
efficiency cost of  taxation.  It is a further question how
efficiency cost can be measured, and whether there is convincing
3I am neglecting here the issue of the incidence of the tax.
Producers of decadent capitalist goods may be taxed in lieu of
taxing consumers directly; the same outcome --  a reduction in
output of  the commodity --  will occur.10
evidence that efficiency costs are large and important.  It Is to
this issue that we turn next.  First, selective evidence for a
variety of tax instruments is presented, from both developed and
developing countries.  As noted above, this evidence is chosen for
its illustrative or pedagogical value; no attempt is made to make an
exhaustive survey of taxation and incentives.
III.  Taxation and Economic Behavior
The following section reviews the evidence about how taxation
affects economic incentives.  Because different tax instruments  wlll
have different effects on behavior, each tax is discussed
separately.
Trade Taxation
Import and export taxes have been the principle method of
collecting taxes for countries in early stages of development.  The
ease of administrating a tax collected at only a few entry and exit
ports explains trade taxes'  popularity.  Yet early on, governments
recognized the costs of excess customs duties.  For example, an
unnamed commissioner in the 18th century English customs shared this
advice;
I will tell you a secret, which I learned many years ago from
the commissioners of the customs in London: they said when
any commodity appeared to be taxed above a moderate rate, the
cons*quence was to lessen that branch of the revenue by one--
half; and one of these gentlemen pleasantly told me that the
miLtake of parliaments on such occasions was owing to an
error of computing two and two make four; whereas in the
business of laying impositions, two and two never made more
than one....  [Smith, 1976: (ii)  411]11
What is lurking In the commissioners' mind is an early
precursor of the "Laffer" effect; that revenue may even fall if
tariffs are raised.  It is only in the extreme case that revenue
will decline when tariffs increase, but the principle --  that taxes
can have a strong impact on the quantity of legal imports --  is
emphasized here.  There are two reasons why revenue may suffer in
response to a tax increase.  The first is that the tax discourages
imports, leading to a decline in consumption of the good.  The
second cost is the erosion of tax revenue through smuggling.  This
is  a different type of cost; the smuggled good is still consumed,
but at higher resource costs for extra-legal transportation (and
associated anti-smuggling resource costs).
Additional evidence in favor of the strong price sensitivity of
imports comes from the reduction in British tariffs on tea after
1745 reported by McCulloch (1845),  and depicted in Figure 2.  The
effective average import  duty, and total imports,  are reported for
each year between 1741 and 1750.  In 1745, the tea tariff was
reduced by more than 50 percent, with a pronounced effect on
importation of tea.4 It seems clear in this case that much of the
increased importation  of tea was due to a reduction in smuggling,
although consumption of tea is likely to have increased as well.
4One should always be wary of using event studies to make
inferences about whether A affects B, since other factors  which
changed at the same time may have affected B as well.  However,
the dramatic change in imports over such a short period at a time
when the tax rate has changed provides strong evidence in favor
of the inference that the lowered tax rate increased tea imports.12
Figure 2:Tariff  Rates and Imports  of Tea,
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Source:  McCulloch (I'4S5S),  page 332.  Tea is  measured
in thousands  of pounds13
Nevertheless, the income transfer from smugglers who previously
could pocket the smuggling premium, to consumers paying lower
prices, is a laudable social goal in itself.
Not all goods will respond so readily to tax cuts.  These
illustrations are provided to show the extreme degree of distortions
that taxes are capable of imposing.  In most cases, reducing tax
rates will lead to increased consumption (and  production) of the
good In question, which reduces the social efficiency cost, but
revenue will generally fall in response to the tax cut.  There are a
few exceptions; Lindsey (1987), for example, suggested that the
decline in the U.S. capital gains tax actually increased tax revenue
during the early 1980s.  The evidence is strong, however, that such
"Laffer" effects are rare anomalies (for a review, see Fullerton,
1982).  The point remains that even if a tax cut does not increase
revenue, it will increase consumption of the good and, to the extent
that consumption of the imported good is deemed socially desirable,
augment nat.&cGnal  welfare.
McCulloch (1845)  also pointed out the risks of assessing heavy
export taxes for countries with market power in that export good.
The duty on cinnamon exported from Ceylon may be referred to
in illustration  of the mischievous consequences resulting
from carrying duties on exports, even when the exporting
country has great facilities of production on her side, to an
unreasonable extent  ....This (export]  duty was sure,... to
prevent the trade from extending; but it has done more than
this: it has led to the introduction  and successful
cultivation of the cinnamon plant in Java- Guiana, and the
West Indies; and it has also led to the general substitution
of cassia in the place of cinnamon [pp. 197-198]14
More recently, the impact of export taxes on agricultural
output has been the focus  of many World Bank studies,  some of which
are summarized in the 1986 World Development Report.  The oft-cited
experience of Ghana with export taxes on cocoa (either  explicit or
implicit, through marketing boards and fixed exchange rates) is a
particularly dramatic illustration of the incentive effects of
taxation.  Like Ceylon many years ago, the monopoly posltion of
Bangladesh in jute has been eroded as synthetic substitutes have
been developed.  The gains from monopoly pricing of export goods may
be short lived. 5
More recent studies of trade taxation have stressed the complex
effects of import and export taxation on the entire economy.  There
are a number of simulation models which implement econometrically
estimated parameters in general equilibrium  models of particular
countries (Clarete  and Whalley, 1987; also see Shoven and Whalley,
1985).  The excess burden of trade taxation is then addressed using
a "counterfactual"  --  what would be production and income if the
existing tariffs were replaced by increasing other taxes so that
government revenue is held constant?  A comparison of real income,
or of consumer utility, provides a measure of the excess burden of
the tax.  That is, these models can calculate the loss in consumer
"surplus" caused by tariffs.  The disadvantage with the simulation
5  Recent oligopolistic models of trade have emphasized the use
of export subsidies or taxes to provide an advantage to the home
country in the bargaining game over production and prices.  See
Eaton and Grossman (1986).15
is that lt cannot be tested, and the accuracy of the prediction In
only as good as the assumptions embedded in the model.
Some studies of tariffs in general equilibrium models have
shown small welfare costs, in part because of the relatively
moderate tariff rates and the minor importance of the taxed goods in
national income.  However, like the example of the bicycles
discussed above, the marginal cost of increasing trade barriers are
often substa.-,tial  relative to the revenue collected.  In particular,
Clarete and Whalley (1987) calculated that the marginal efficiency
cost of raising a tariff in the Philippines above 20 percent was in
excess of 100 percent of the revenue raised.  Of courses, their
results depend crucially on the assumptions  made about supply and
demand elasticities.
U:oll  Taxation
There have been many studies of the efficiency cost caused by
payroll taxes in developed countries.  In general, the efficiency
costs were found to be minimal, owing to low estimated elasticities
of labor supply for men (for a review, see Killingsworth, 1983).
Generally, the responsiveness of labor supply to its own wage is
higher for married women, and for older and younger workers.
A graphic example of how payroll taxes affect hours of work is
provided by data in Kotlikoff (1978).  Fiqure 3 displays the
frequersy distribution of wage earnings for men over aged 65 in the
US (not including the 32 percent earning over $4000 dollars).  The
spike in the middle of the distribution occurs because wage earnings
over $2400 (in 1974) were implicitly taxed at a very high rate.  For16
Figure 3:  Percent Distribution  of Workers
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Source: Kotlikoff (1978).  Earnings  intervals  are
$200; 32 percent  earned more than $4000.  The Social
Security earnings limit is $2400.17
those enrolled in social securlty (the  vast majority of the
population), benefits were reduced by 50 cents for every one dollar
increase in wage earnings over $2400.  The spike just under $2400
suggests that if the tax had not been in existence, more hours would
have been supplied.  Once again, this "bunching" represents a net
loss to society, since the potential workers limit their hours,
which only deprives the government of revenue.6
Payroll taxes in developed countries are thought to cause
efficiency losses because workers vary their labor supply in
response to the net wage rate.  This neoclassic view is viewed by
Fields (1987)  as irrelevant to developing country tax policy.  He
views labor demand in developing countries as being consistent with
a dual market; the "modern" or urban sector pays a higher wage to
otherwise identical workers than the traditional or rural sector.
As a consequence, rural workers migrate to cities as long as the
expected value of getting a highly paid job exceeds their
agricultural wage rate (Harris  and Todaro, 1970).  In the Harris and
Todaro model, higher urban wages cause a reduction in rural output
(as migration to the cities occurs) and more unemployment.  Hence
taxes on labor in urban areas would have positive effects, since by
reducing the net urban wage, migration and urban unemployment could
be reduced.
The analysis above assumes that the tax is borne entirely by
6Revenues include both payroll taxes on extra hours of work, and
the potential reduction in social security benefits.18
the worker, so that her net wage falls by the entire amount of the
tax.  Alternatively, the payroll tax could be passed along to
consumers through higher prices.  Since the payroll tax is often
assersed on larger-scale  companies in the "modern" sector, it could
be viewed as a tax on this type of business organization.  In sum,
if the payroll tax is simply a tax on doing business for large scale
companies, and if the tax is passed along to consumers (see  Brent,
1986), then its distortion in developing countries is to
artificially raise prices of some goods and potentially discourage
the development of the taxed sector.  The question remains as to
what fraction of the payroll tax is passed along to consumers
through higher prices.  This is not known; for example, one might
expect that prices of domestically produced goods which compete with
internationally marketed goods would be relatively insensitive to
payroll taxation.
Taxation of Investment and Savinos
There is a substantial and growing literature on measuring the
efficiency cost of investment and savings taxation in developed
countries.  The efficiency cost takes two forms.  First, if the rate
of return on savings is reduced, savers face lower interest rates.
Holding overall tax revenue constant (so that the change is
"compensated"; roughly speaking, the taxpayer's lifetime  disposable
income is held constant), consumers will consume too much and invest
too little today, at the expense of future consumption.
The second problem associated with this tax is that it19
attenuates the capital stock.  Over tle,  as les  investment takes
place, the growth in the capital stock will fall, which (in a
neoclassical model) will lead to a lower overall standard of living;
national income and wages will both decline.  Many studies of
savings and '.nvestment  taxation have focused on the impact of
taxation on the dynamic path of capital growth.
The excess burden of a tax either on savings or ca taxation
will dtpend on how sensitive these factors are to taxation.  At
present, there is no consJstent evidence that net-of-tax interest
rates have a strong effect on savings rates.  In the United States,
Denison's Law --  that gross private savings was a constant fraction
of  GNP --  was once invoked as evidence that taxes and interest rates
had no effect on savings rates.  However, as Boskin (1978)
suggested, the relevant measure of savings for tax policy purposes
was net savings as a fraction of disposable income.  (Furthermore,
the observed fraction of gross private saving to GNP has diverged
from its historlcal levels.)  The results of econometric studies
testing  whether taxation, or the net interest rate, affect savings,
are mixed (e.g.,  Boskin, 1978; Howrey and Hymans, 1978).  There h::ve
been a number of recent studies in savings behavior for developing
countries (for  a survey, see Balassa, 1988); in general, these
studies have found a positive interest elasticity of saving, but the
results appear sensitive to which country is chosen.  As Balassa
(1988)  and Mikesell and Zinser (1973)  have pointed out, estimating
the interest elasticity of saving from developing country data (even
if it does exist) may be difficult owing to the imperfectly  measured20
national income accounts.  Thus studies which have found no  interest
elasticity of saving may have used data too weak to reveal it.  On
the other hand, specification searches over savings rate regression
equations which stop once the interest rate c.oefficient  becomes
positive and significant could bias the literature in favor of
finding a positive saving elasticity (Leamer, 1978).
The introduction  of IRAs in the U.S. has provided one natural
experiment to test the effect of savings incentives.  The success of
IRAs has been undeniable; by June 30, 1988, more than 300 billion
dollars had been invested in IRAs.  In itself, this is not a test of
savings incentives,  since the sudden increase in IRAs could
represent a shift out of other, more heavily taxed, savings
instrument,.  That is. IRAs could have been reshuffled saving from
existing (taxable)  accounts, rather than new saving from foregone
consumption.  Feenberg and Skinner (1989),  and Venti and Wise (1987)
suggest that the data are consistent with the "new" savina view of
IRAs; that is, IRAs did represent new saving. 7
Other researchers have attempted to evaluate the impact of
taxation on savings in computable general equilibrium models using
parameter values estimated in econometric studies (Summers, 1981;
Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley; 1983; Auerbach, Kotlikoff and
Skinner, 1983; Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley, 1985)  In
7  While the results in Feenberg and Skinner are consistent with
the new saving view, they are also consistent with a more subtle
reshuffling  view of IRAs.  At this stage it is difficult to
conclude that IRA saving is entirely new saving.21
these models, individuals  hold a varying degree of foresight, and
make current consumptlon  and savings choices based not simply on
current prices, but on future prices as well.  They find uniformly
large efficiency gains from switching to a general income tax to a
consumption based tax.  One explanation for these results is the
extent to which future prices affect current consumption for the
life cycle consumers.  The reason is that over the extended horizon
relevant for consumption, a 30 o- 40 percent tax on interest can
translate into a large distortion against future consumption.  For
example, if the gross interest rate were 8 percent and the tax were
40 percent, then the net return would be 4.8 percent.  The cost of
consuming one dollar of consumption 30 years in the future, in terms
of current consumptiox.,  is 10 cents at the 8 percent interest rate,
and 24 cents at the 4.8 percent interest rate.  That is, the 40
percent statutory real tax rate translates into a 140 ([24-1O]/10)
percent tax on future consumption.  Another explanation for the
large saving elasticities focuses on the individual's endowment of
future earnings (Summers, 1981).  A decline in the interest rate
implies that the present value of future  earnings will rise, which
will tend to increase current consumption  and hence reduce saving
further.  Given the combination of these two effects, it is not
surprising that cuts in capital income taxation yield an improvement
in utility, especially in models with infinitely lived individuals
(Chamley, 1981).
It should be emphasized that the large savings elasticities
which are implied by the life cycle model are rarely found in22
empirical studies.  This could be caused by inappropriate measures
of savings, or by aggregation bias (in time series studies).  My own
opinion  is that the simulation  studies  neglect  issues  of
uncertainty.  If, for example, there is uncertainty about future
interest rates and wages (Skinner, 1988),  or about what future taxes
will be (Skinner, 1989), fluctuations in current net-of-tax interest
rates are unlikely to signal a large change in future interest
rates.  This year's jump  in the tax rate provides only a small
amount of "news", relative to "noise" about the net interest rate 10
years hence.  The role of uncertainty is likely to be even more
important in developing countries, where regime shifts and
fluctuating commodity prices are the norm.
Econometric studies of savings in developing countries are
difficult, owing to problems of measurement.  First, gross domestic
saving is measured as a residual by subtracting the current account
deficit from gross capital formation.  Because there are usually no
independent  mea&'ures  of national income, it is often difficult to
check the accuracy of the savings estimates (Mikesell  and Zinser,
1973).  In addition, there is no single net return to saving or user
cost of capital;  different investment projects receive different
tax treatment, while some savings accounts may enjoy preferential
treatment over others.  In light of these measurement problems, it
is perhaps not surprising that evidence from developing countries
about savings and taxation is mixed.
A more general model of savings and investment allows for the
two to differ by including an international sector.  In such a23
model,  lncentivee for investment wlll affect the country capital
stock differently than incentives for savings (for example, Nutti
and Grubert, 1985; Frankel and Razin, 1988).  The reason is that
investment incentives will encourage foreign investment in the home
country, independent of what home country savings happens to be.
Alternatively, a pure saving incentive (i.e.,  exempting capital
gains from taxation) will encourage domestic saving, but the saving
may be invested in other countries if the rates of return in those
countries exceed investment opportunities in the home country.d
De. tte the theoretical unshackling of incentives to encourage
saving, and incentives to encourage investment, there is a
surprising degree of correlation between the two measures across
countries (Feldstein  and Horioka, 1980).
The discussion below will focus on investment incentives, since
developing countries are often concerned with attracting foreign
investment from developed countries.  In addition, evidence is
presented on the impact of the tax code on U.S. investment abroad,
and on direct foreign investment in the U.S.
The fundamental  problem with assessing the importance of
investment incentives on actual investment is whether such
provisions encourage additional investment.  Firms which had already
planned to invest in the country would take advantage of the
8  This assumes that taxes are based on residence; hence a US
saving incentive will benefit a US citizen whether his savings
are invested in the US or in Mexico.  Alternatively, a US citizen
could invest  money in a Swiss bank to avoid high residence-based
taxes.24
incentive, possibly without any change in economlc behavior.  If
this were the case, the "incentives"  would simply  represent a
transfer of revenue from the government to the business sector.
Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of fiscal incentives offered
in 28 developing countries; the data are from Shah and Toye (1980).9
The primary mechanism for providing investment incentives is the tax
holiday, in which the company is exempt from company taxes for a
fixed number of years which, in this sample, ranges from 2 to 10.
The second most popular incentive is some form of high depreciation
allowance, investment credit, or development rebate.  The third
commonly used scheme is the exemption of imported capital goods from
import tariffs.
There are a number of methods for testing whether these
incentives are effective.10 Some studies have examined the
investment to GNP ratio before and after the tax changes (see
references in Shah and Toye (ST)),  although it is difficult to
attribute changes in this ratio only to the tax changes.
Essentially (if there is no trend), there is a 50 percent
probability that the investment to GNP ratio will go up after the
tax change.
Alternatively, the businessmen can be interviewed to assess
9For an overview of investment incentives in developing
countries, also see Usher (1977).
10This section draws heavily on Shah and Toye (1980).25
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whether the tax incentives were important in their decisions.  In a
study of Mexico (Stanford  and Christensen, 1959; quoted in ST), 14
of 24 firms surveyed said they would have invested the same amount
even in the absence of the tax incentives.  Nine firms reported that
the "probably" would have invested the same amount, while only one
firm attributed an important role for the tax incentives.  Of 40
Pakistani firms surveyed, 8 reported that the tax incentives were
important factors in their decision (Azhar  and Sharif, 1974; ST).
The equivalent figures for Jamaica was two firms out of 55 surveyed
(Chen-Young, 1967; ST).  As Shah and Toye (1980)  note, bias in
questionnaires can go in two directions.  The first is that
businessmen claim that the tax effects are no important, in order to
extract more concessions from the government.  The second, more
likely, bias is that businesses may overstate the impact of the
incentives to convince the government to retain such "effective" tax
instruments.
A third method is to calculate what profits would have been had
there been no investment incentive, and compare that measure with a
"critical minimum rate of profit which firms require."  If the
profit rate without incentives is below that rate, but the profit
rate with incentives is above that rate, the incentive package is
judged to have been a success.  Tax incentives in Pakistan (Azhar
and Sharif, 1974; Kemal, 1975) and in Colombia (Billsborrow  and
Porter, 1972) were estimated to have increased investment by 20
percent, 30 percent, and 10 percent, respectively (the two Pakistan
studies used different assumptions).28
Desplte the wide use of investment incentives, the evidence
about their effectiveness is mixed.  What, then, accounts for their
widespread use in the face of such little evidence of their
effectiveness?  Shah and Toye consider a number of possible
explanations.  The first is that tax evasion and avoidance will
allow firms to avoid paying taxes, so countries simply  make dn  y=
what is already An  facto.  However, it seems hard to believe that
large and visible corporate representatives of wealthy capitallst
countries can evade tax collection as easlly as the small merchant
In the marketplace.
Another explanation suggests that competition among countries
for foreign investment will keep taxes to a minimum.  While this
explanation may appear reasonable for smaller countries, it is less
appealing for countries such as Nigeria or Indonesia that have large
domestic economies.
Shah and Toye suggest finally that the nature of the
incentives,  and the fact that they coexist with quantity
restrictions and licensing regulation,  suggests that countries are
not necessarily responding to outside demand pressures, but instead
to the pressures of wealthy investors inside the country, who stand
to benefit from the manipulation of quantity restrictions and other
government constraints, while at the same time freeing companies
from paying taxes.
In summary, the wide use of investment incentives appear to
have some effect on business investment,  but at a high cost of
foregone revenue to companies who would have invested without29
Incentives.  The potential for transfer pricing and other financial
contortions to shift company profits into branches that enjoy tax
concessions is likely to rcduce revenue as well.  A better
explanation for why investment incentives are so popular may come
from industrialist  political pressure groups who enjoy influence
with legislators and governments.
Econometric evidence from the United States seems to suggest a
pronounced role for tax policy in affecting the location of
investment.  Boskin and Gale (1986),  updating and extending work by
Hartman (1984),  suggest that the own-price elasticity of foreign
Investment in the U.S. is approximately 1.0, while the own-price
elasticity of U.S. investment abroad is in excess of 1.0.  There
appears to be some stability in these estimates, despite the
substantial fluctuation in direct foreign investment in the United
States during the early 1980s.
To this point, the negative impact of taxation on investment
has been emphasized.  However, comparative  data across countries
provides a dissenting view.  Figure 4 shows average investment/GDP
ratios over the period 1970-80 compared to average tax effort (tax
revenue/GDP) over the same period.11 There is a strong positive
l1The investment and GDP data come from Summers and Heston
(1984),  and are in real terms.  The Summers and Heston series is
calculated to provide internationally comparable measures of
national accounts.  See Lindauer (1987)  for a comparison of these
data with standard government statistics.
Note that only average tax rates are used here.  While
marginal tax rates would be more useful, they are not available
for developing countries.30
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correlation between investment ratios and the overall tax effort
(Koester and Kormendi, 1988).
One interpretation of the colrelation between taxation and
gross investment would be that a large fraction of the investment is
public, so that higher tax rates translate into higher investment
rates.  This finding  would be in accordance with the traditional
view that the government has a higher marginal propensity to save,
so that higher taxes lead to higher overall savings rates.  The
positive correlation between private investment/GDP ratios and
average tax rates in African countries, however, is less consistent
with this view.  The positive correlation could also be consistent
with a "crowding out" argument; that higher tax effort will be
associated with lower deficits, so there will be less national
saving absorbed by public debt creation.  Whether crowding out is an
important factor in incomplete financial markets of LDCs is not
clear at this point.  In summary, the positive correlation  between
the ratio of total investment to GDP, and average tax effort is
something of a paradox.
Taxation of Wealth a&d ProRerty
The taxation of property has been one of the earliest sources
of government revenue.  Governments have relied either on movable
property, such as livestock, or on immovable property, such as land
and structures.  While these taxes may appear to be relatively
non-distortionary, they can change property owners' behavior in such
a way to reduce economic efficiency.  Consider first the immovable
property tax as administered in 17th century England.  Rather than a32
lump sum tax on dwellings, the tax was based on the size of the
house, as proxied by the number of hearths.  The tax led to some
hearths being walled up; Sir keter Courtney In Cornwall walled up 6
of 21 hearths during 1662 (Stoate, 1981).  In a comparison of hearth
tax assessments between 1662 and 1664, fully 3.2 percent of all
hearths in 1662 were reported walled up in 1664 (Stoate, 1981; pages
xii-xiii).
There was apparently some confusion over whether the walled up
fireplaces were restored after the tax collector left, or whether
they were permanently walled up.  A permanent reduction in the
number of hearths corresponds to an efficiency loss from the tax.
Residents gain nothing from the hearths, nor does the government
collect any revenue.  Yet the original owner spent resources on
building the now useless hearth.  Alternatively, the hearths could
be walled up temporarily, to coincide with the visit of the tax
collector.  While the hearths would be used (between tax
collections), a substantial amount of wasted effort would go into
bricking, and then bashing, the barrier.  Another example of
permanent efficiency cost were the houses built with fewer windows
so as to avoid the window tax.  The efficiency loss is the necessity
of residents to live in dark houses, with no corresponding gain to
the government.
There is also historical evidence that the taxation of movable
property leads to a waste of resources.  For example, Adam Smith
finds that33
In the countries where the personal taille takes place, the
farmer Is commonly assessed in proportion to the stock which
he appears to employ in cultivation.  He is, upon this
account, frequently afraid to have a good team of horses or
oxen, but endeavours to cultivate with the meanest and most
wretched instruments  of husbandry that he can....The public,
the farmer, the landlord, all suffer more or less by this
degraded cultivation. (Smith, 1976: 383-384]
Since the 17th and 18th century, there has been a  general
decline in the use of wealth taxes.  Especially in the case of land
taxation, they have proved to be highly unpopular, and with the
monetization of economies, governments have switched gratefully to
sales, customs, and income taxation.  There are only two real
exceptions to the general decline in wealth taxation; the first is
the urban property tax, and the second is the property transfer tax.
Urban property taxation, while struggling with assessment lags and
evasion, has maintained a strong role in supporting local finances.
The taxation of property transfer occurs only when deeds or
titles are transferred  and recorded by government agencies.  It is
economically less efficient than the straight taxation of property,
since it restricts the mobility of property by "locking in"
ownership.  Transfer taxation is often justified as taxing wealthy
landowners who are buying additional land, but the tax may just as
well cause a fall in the net sale price of the potentially
distressed landowner who is forced to sell by economic necessity.
The transfer tax ranges in most countries from 3 percent to 15
percent; in one country (Bangladesh), it raises more in revenue than
a tax assessed on all land, despite the fact that land transfers are
quite infrequent.  One reason why the property transfer tax may34
enjoy increasing popularity is its potential for maintaining  revenue
collection in the face of inflation.  While property tax assessments
typically lag far behind market value in countries with high
inflation rates, declared property transfer prices will keep up
with, or even surpass, inflation rates.  Furthermore, the
administrative costs of the tax are very low, since the tax must be
paid before the deed is transferred to the new owner.
Tax Administration.  ne  Costs. and Smuaalina
Historical examples of tax avoidance and administrative costs
are numerous.  In 17th century France, the costs of administration
were far greater than the net revenue to the government; of the 19
million livres expected from the taille (a lump sum or poll tax),
only 6 million were delivered to the central treasury.  The
remainder was consumed by administrators and local tax collectors
(Webber  and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 278).  By the same token, the
zamindars, or tax "farmers", in India had by 1900 increased revenue
from farmers to Rp. 165 million, but turned over to the British
government only Rp. 39 million (Hossain,  Rahman, and Akash, 1985).
More recently, the Bangladesh Land Development Tax has reported
administrative costs in excess of 66 percent of total tax revenue.
One reason why the administrative costs of these taxes have been so
high is that a large fraction of the population must be induced to
pay very small payments, leading to a great deal of administrative
effort for each rupee or taka.
Trade taxation is usually the tax instrument exhibiting the
lowest collection cost.  Adam Smith reported average costs of35
slightly over 10 percent of revenue, but since that time collection
costs have fallen to an average of 1 to 3 percent, even in lese
developed countries.
Aside from the direct administrative costs, taxpayers often
reduce tax payments by evading or misrepresenting the value on which
their tax is assessed.  During the 13th century, movable property
taxes in England were occasionally assessed for to pay ransoms for
captured kings, provide a dowry for princesses, or to finance holy
crusades.  During this time, English taxpayers were not slow to
discover the benefits of under assessing property:
We have lately heard that the four jurors ...  are violating
their oaths by false valuations, namely, they generally value
an ox at five shillings, when it is worth ten shillings or
even more; a pig which is worth two are three shillings, they
value at 6d.; ...  we shall not receive half of the thirtieth
granted to us so generously  by the magnates and others of our
realm. [Close rolls, 1234-1237, p. 569; from Mitchell (1970)]
What are the costs involved here?  There are clearly
administrative problems, but if every juror persists in undervaluing
the property, then the target revenue could just as well be raised
by doubling the tax rate.  Yet assessors could compensate for the
doubling by undervaluing to an even greater extent.  However,
variations in assessment practices will lead to inequities in tax
collection as well.
An additional cost of tax administration is tax compliance.
Even if taxpayers are perfectly honest, they must still spend time
and money on keeping records for tax collection, and on preparing36
their tax return.  In some countries, this compliance cost ls
reflected in administrative costs, since the tax officials will also
fill out tax returns.  However, in most countries these are costs
borne entirely by the taxpayers.  Slemrod and Sorum (1984), for
example, have estimated the aggregate cost of tax compliance was
between $17 and $27 billion dollars in the United States during
1982.  This translates to more than 5 percent of total taxes
collected.
A further cost of taxation is the uncertainty caused by a
change in the tax regime.  For example, following the 1981 Economic
Recovery Act in the U.S., companies were allowed to trade tax
credits.  This "safe harbor leasing" provision was controversial,
and it was uncertain whether it would be rescinded.  Fear of the tax
change lead to sales of the tax benefits at less than half their
actual value, because, as one corporation chairman put it, he feared
the "risk of losing the tax benefits through a change in the tax law
or other contingencies." (Skinner, 1989).
More generally, uncertainty about future tax rates often leads
to a welfare loss.  If, for example, the government sets new taxes
that provide investment incentives,  countries may be unwilling to
invest because they are not convinced that future tax rates will not
increase.  In this situation, the government treasury loses revenue
without associated gains in investment.  In summary, repeated tax
reform may be viewed not as a successive approximation to the
optimal tax system, but as a signal that new tax changes are
forecast for the future.37
On the Marainal  Cost  of Taxatio
The previous subsections have attempted to provide heuristic
illustrations of the social cost of taxation.  For the purposes of
tax reform, however, one often focuses on marginal tax changes.  As
was illustrated in Section II, the marginal cost of increasing
revenue from an existing tax is generally higher than the overall
(or average) tax burden.  It is therefore useful to briefly review
the evidence on the marginal cost of raising (or  benefits of
cutting) taxes, since these measures are important for making policy
judgments.
The literature on the excess burden of taxation has, for the
most part, used models most appropriate for developed countries.
The focus of Stuart (1984),  Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985b),
Browning (1976, 1987), and others has been to calculate the marginal
excess burden of taxation in the United States in competitive models
with generally free factor flows and prices which adjust to the
different tax rates.
Among the first studies of marginal excess burden was Browning
(1976).  He estimated that the excess burden was between 9 and 16
cents per dollar of revenue collected.  Later researchers found
measures larger in magnitude; using a two-sector general equilibrium
model of the United States, Stuart (1984) found that the marginal
excess burden of a labor income tax was between 7 and 50 cents,
depending in part on how the revenue was used.  Similarly, a
computable dynamic general equilibrium study by Ballard, Shoven, and
Whalley (1985)  suggested that the excess burden was between 25 and38
50 cents per dollar.  One might think that the difference between
Browning and later studies is due to the later studies allowing for
general equilibrium effects.  However, Browning (1987)  argues that
most of the difference in the marginal excess burden measures is
caused by different assumptions about the cO1 rect empirical
parameters of the model.  For example, in a simple partial
equilibrium model, he showed that the marginal excess burden (in the
case where earnings are allowed to decline) could range from 11
cents per dollar to 3 dollars, depending on the labor supply
elasticity (either .2  or .4); the progressivity of the tax (the
ratio of marginal to average taxes being either .8  or 2) and the tax
rate (.38 or .48).  Browning concluded that most of the variation in
marginal excess burden measures occurred because of differences in
empirical parameters.
As Stuart (1984)  has shown, another important factor that
affects the marginal excess burden is how the revenue is used.  If,
for example, the income is redistributed, then compensated
elasticities are used to calculate excess burden.  These are
generally higher than uncompensated elasticities, which are the
appropriate measure for calculating excess burden when the tax is
used for government services which do not substitute for private
services (see Br..._ard,  1987).
Ahmed and Stern (1984)  focused on the marginal excess burden of
different commodity taxes in developing countries.  Based on
cross-price elasticity estimates of commodities in India, they were
able to measure the social marginal excess burden of raising each39
specific  commodity tax rate.  By lncludlng information  on
expendlture shares across Income classes, they were also able to
evaluate the distributional impact of the tax changes.  One use of
thelr estimates would be to first specify some social welfare
function, and then minimize the excess burden of the tax structure
by equating the marglnal cost of Rg&h commodity tax.  They focused
on a different issue --  what social welfare function is maximized by
the observed commodity tax structure set by the government?  That
is, if the social welfare function impllcitly maxlmized  by  the
government is regressive,  or not well defined, it suggests the need
for changes in the tax structure.
The previous section has attempted to document the incentive
effects of taxation.  Factors such as efficiency costs and
compliance costs are difficult to measure directly, although one
might expect that ultimately, they will be reflected in national
Income.  It is to this topic that we turn next.
IV.  OutDut Growth and Taxation
There are two methods for estimating the efficiency costs of
taxation.  The first is to develop a theoretical model, and
calculate efficiency costs by plugging in empirical parameters from
a variety of studies.  The second, which is followed below,
estimates what is essentially a reduced form equation of taxation,
fiscal policy, and GDP.  The advantage of this method is that it is
a direct measure of efficiency costs which reflects parameters (such40
as the dynamic effects of tax policy )  whlch are generally difflcult
to model properly in theoretical models.  In addition, the estimates
derived below are readily understandable to policy makers --  do
taxes affect the level, or the growth rate, in national output?
There are shortcomings to this direct estimation of taxation and
output; the potential for mismeasured data, unobservable factors
affecting both tax rates and output, and endogeneity.  These
shortcomings are discussed in more detail below.
While this survey is concerned primarily with the excess burden
of taxation, the models discussed below can be used to address a
broader issue,  which is whether the benefits of government spending
justify the efficiency costs of the taxes necessary to finance it.12
That is, taxes may be distortionary, but the relevant policy
question is whether the marginal benefits of tax-financed government
expenditures exceed the marginal distortionary costs of collecting
the revenue.
The review of the evidence that follows  will both summarize
existing literature,  and provide new evidence from a complete sample
of Ill countries using variables on output, investment,  and
t2There are sources of government revenues other than taxes, but
I would argue that taxation is the only feasible long-term  method
of financing.  Debt can be used in the short run, but taxes must
be raised in the future to pay back the debt.  While the country
has the option to default (or inflate away the value of the
debt), it is unlikely to find new sources of borrowed money after
doing so.41
government consumption.  The data are derived from Summers and
Heston (1984),  the Government Financial Statistics (IMF, 1986) and
other sources, and are discussed in more detail in Engen and Skinner
(1988).  The Summers and Heston data have been converted to
internationally comparable price levels, and have been widely used
in cross-country studies.  I begin first with ad-hoc linear  models
of taxation and national output, and of government spending and
national output.  Second, Ram's model of government spending, and
Engen and Skinner's model which includes both government spending
and taxation, is presented.  Finally, potential shortcomings of
these cross-country estimation models are discussed.
The study by Marsden (1983)  was among the first to test the
hypothesis that taxes should affect output growth rates. 13 He
matched 10 high tax countries, ouch as Zambia, Britain, Chile, and
Zaire, with 10 low tax countries such as Singapore, Korea, Uruguay,
and Japan.  The country pairs were chosen on the basis of "similar
per capita incomes but contrasting tax levels," and the difference
in growth rates for the two sets of countries were then calculated.
Countries with high tax rates (defined to be the ratio of tax
revenue to GDP) experienced a lower average growth rate than those
with low tax rates.  Marsden's results imply that "an increase of
13The earlier literature on taxation and output focused on the
opposite question --  what is the "appropriate" tax effort for a
country in a particular stage of development.  The direction of
causation is modeled in reverse; GDP, the independent  exogenous
variable, affects the choice of tax effort, the dependent
variable (Newlyn, 1985; Tanzi, 1987).42
one percentage point in the tax/GDP ratio decrease. the rate of
economic growth by 0.36 percent (sic) points."  Translating from
growth rates to differences in per capita income, Marsden's
coefficient implies that a 3 percent increase in the tax to GDP
ratio will reduce the level of GDP 20 years in the future by 20
20 percentage  points  (1 - .036x3)
One shortcoming  with this study is the lack of a  theoretical
framework, a problem that it shares with a number of other studies.
For example, as is discussed below, standard neoclassical growth
theory predicts that tax rates affect the level, but not the arowt
rate of GDP in steady-state equilibrium.  Second, the choice of the
20 country sample is not random.  A better test of the hypothesis
that taxation affects output growth is to examine the entire sample
of  countries for which data are available.  A scatter diagram is
presented in Figure 5 which shows real GDP growth as measured by
Summers and Heston for the period 1970-1980, compared to the average
tax rate during that period.1 4 There is no obvious simple
correlation between tax rates and GDP growth rates; the slope of the
regression line (shown in the graph) is -.036 (so that a one
percentage point increase in the tax effort is predicted to reduce
output growth by .036  percentage points) and is insignificant.
One potential shortcoming with Figure 5 is that all countries
are weighted equally; if small countries are "outliers", they may
14For some countries, tax rates (and  output growth rates) were
averaged over 8 or 9 years owing to the lack of data.43
Figure  5s  GDP Growth  Rates  and  Average
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mask the true correlation between output growth rates  and taxatlon.
To correct for this, Figure 6 presents the correlation between
taxation and output growth weighted by the (normalized)  country
population.  Again, no clear correlation arises.  Finally, Marsden
(1983) in his matching technique, attempts to correct for
differences in per capita income.  A regression which contrels for
per capita income levels is as follows:
y =  0.046  +  0.OO7xTax  - 0.316xY  R=  .004
(7.87)  (0.18)  (1.61)  N  111
where Y (in  percentages) and Y (in thousands of US dollars) are
the growth rate, and level, of GDP, respectively, and absolute
values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  Given that the
coefficient on Tax (the tax effort) is insignificant, there does not
seem to be a simple correlation between growth rates and taxation
(also see Koester and Kormendi, 1988).
The impact of taxation on output growth rates is mixed
conditional on a larger number of variables in cross-country
regressions.  For example, Martin and Fardmanesh, 1987 (their
regression D, p. 18) find that taxation has little effect on growth
rates, conditional on accumulated investment, population growth, and
government spending.  Koester and Kormendi (1988)  similarly find
little evidence that taxation affects growth rates.  However, Landau
(1986)  estimates a negative conditional correlation, as does Engen
and Skinner (1988)  and Skinner (1987).  To illustrate this finding,
consider again the full sample of 111 countries during the period45
Fig-ure  6:  GDP Growth  Rites  and  Average
Tax  Rates,  Weighted  by  Population:  1970-80
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1970-80.  A simple regression of output growth and  taxation which
conditions on I/Y, the accumulated change in gross investment over
the 11 year period, r.,  the percentage change in population, and G/Y,
government spending as a fraction of (initial) Y, is estimated to be
Y =  0.019  +  0.160xI/Y  +  0.895xL  - 0.098xG/Y - 0.062xTax
(1.53)  (4.64)  (3.10)  (2.10)  (1.67)
R2 - .240
The coefficient on average tax rates is significant at the 10
percent level.  It is interesting to note that when the model is
specified somewhat differently --  substituting the change in G
divided  by Y for G/Y, as suggested  by Ram  (1986) --  the tax
coefficient rises to -.082, with a significance level of 2.51.
Koester and Kormendi (1988)  used country specific regressions
to calculate marginal tax rates.  They ran the regression
Taxt  =  a0 +  a1GDPt
for each country and interpreted al to be the marginal tax rate.
This is an ingenious method for measuring marginal tax rates from a
minimum source of data, but it will also pick up discretionary
changes in the tax code.  Strictly speaking, such changes would not
measure marginal tax "wedges" since they reflect inframarginal
revenue collected on an existing tax base.15 However, the authors
15If a country has two sectors, and tax rates in one sector are
higher than in the other, then if the heavily taxed sector grows
faster than the other, the "marginal" tax as measured by this
regression method will be higher than the average tax, even when
the sector-specific taxes are held constant.47
found that the ranking of countries according to their eatimated
marginal tax measures correlated well with a ranking based on the
statutory marginal tax rates.
As noted earlier, they found little impact of marginal rates on
output growth, although in cross-sectional regressions on the levfll
of output, they found that the average tax rate had a  positive
effect, and the marginal tax rate a negative effect on output, with
strong significance for each coefficient.  They interpreted the
positive coefficient on average taxes to proxy for a demand effect
(larger countries tax more), and the negative coefficient on
marginal tax rates to be the traditional distortionary effect.
One of the difficulties in arriving at a conclusion about the
Impact of taxation on output is the absence of an a  priori model
appropriate for estimating the effect of taxes on output.  One
attempt to develop a theoretical model is described in Skinner
(1988).  While taxes have no effect on the steady state growth path
In neoclassical models (since  growth rates are determined by factors
such as population growth and technological change), taxes will
affect growth rates along a transition path.  Consider a simplified
model of the economy in which there are two sectors in the economy,
one which is heavily taxed (e.g, manufacturing and some large
corporations in developing countries) and one which is not
(small-scale  agriculture, the underground economy, etc.).  Taxes
will tend to induce new economic inputs, such as investment and
labor  supply,  to flow  into the  low-tax  --  and  less productive  --48
sectors.  The introduction of th  rion therefore reduces the overall
marginal productivity of labor anu capital, and thereby lowers the
country growth rate conditional on the observed growth in labor and
capital (this abstracts from secondary effects of taxes on the
supply of labor and capital).  Regression results using a sample of
African countries (Skinner, 1987) and a more complete sample of 111
countries (Engen  and Skinner, 1988) found a significant negative
effect of taxation on the marginal product of capltal and labor.
There has been a substantial amount of empirical research using
cross-country data to test the impact of government spending on
output growth rates.  Landau (1983; 1986) found a strong negative
impact of government spending (and more specifically, government
consumption excluding military and educational expenditures) on
output growth rates (also see Martin and Fardmanesh, 1987).  To test
this proposition using the data on 111 countries mentioned above,
consider a simple graph which compares the average ratio of
government consumption on goods and services to GDP during 1970-80
with GDP growth rates during the same period (Figure  7).  The
regression line (shown  on the graph) is estimated to be
Y = 0.057 - 0.084(G/Y)  R  =  021
(6.68)  (1.84)
That is, the correlation is only moderate.  However, when factors
such as investment and population growth rates are also included,
the results are somewhat stronger:
=  0.012  +  0.132(I/Y)  +  1.154(L)  - 0.118(G/Y)  R  =  .227
(1.00)  (4.32)  (4.69)  (2.61)49
Figuse  '7:  GDP Growth  Rates  and  Government
Spending:  1970-80
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That is, the coefficient on G/Y Is negative and strongly
significant.  Ram (1986)  criticized the functional form used by
Landau.  Essentially, the point is that if Y is a function of 0,
then Y --  the percentage  change  in Y --  should  be a  function  of the
change in G, and not the level of G.  For this reason, Ram (1986a)
developed a model of public and private output which tests the
impact of the growth in government spending with the growth in
output.  He finds a strong positive effect of government spending,
both using cross-sectional analysis and time-series regressions for
each country.  Ram's findings are strongly confirmed using ay sample
of 111 countries; the percentage growth rate in government spending
is contrasted with output growth in Figure 8; the positive
correlation coefficient is highly significant in a bivariate
regression.  Ram interprets this correlation to mean that government
inputs of capital and labor are often more productive, and may
confer positive externalities on the private sector.
While Ram was the first to provide a theoretical foundation for
his econometric estimation, his analysis suffers from two
shortcomings.  First, his theoretical  model expresses G as the
contribution of government capital and labor to value added in GDP.
However, the G that must be used by researchers is expenditures on
goods and services.  Hence measured G is a use, and not a source of
income; the only measured contribution of government to GDP is
through its payroll.51
Figure %:  GDP  Growth  Rates  and  Percentage
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Second, there is the potential for endogeneity.  Countries
which grow quickly may also be likely to expand their government
services.  A regression of the growth in government spending on
output growth may simply reflect a high income elasticity of
government spending.  Ram (1986b)  suggests that this endogeneity is
not serious; a related paper (Ram, 1987) argues that there is little
evidence from cross-country comparisons to support the view that
government consumption is positively related to per capita income
(also see Lindauer, 1987).  Finally, Engen and Skinner (1988)
attempt to control for this endogeneity in a simultaneous equations
model of government spending and output growth.
What do these studies imply about the relative costs and
benefits of tax-financed government spending?  Martin and Ferdmanesh
(1987) found an insignificant but positive effect of taxes on output
growth rates, but government spending has a negative and significant
impact on GDP growth (Regression  D, p.18).  While the authors
interpret this to mean that reducing deficits will spur output
growth, the regression suggests that cutting government spending
will have a greater impact on economic growth than raising taxes.
There are some general shortcomings of cross-sectional studies.
First, it is unlikely that the coefficients estimated will be
similar acioss countries; the marginal product (in elasticity form)53
of a  one percentage point increase in labor supply may be different
for different countries. 16 Another problem is that other,
unobservable factors, such as a well administered civil service,
could encourage growth rates in output, lead to efficient collection
of taxes, and provide government services at low cost.  In this
case, a regression would find a positive coefficient on taxes and a
negative coefficient on government spending, even if there were no
causal relationship among the three factors.  Finally, the
endogeneity problem (as discussed above) can lead to biased
regression coefficients.
In summary, whether one thinks that governrv-ent  spending
contributes to, or subtracts from, output growt:.  depends on the
model that one has in mind.  GDP growth rates are positively
correlated with the growth in G, but negatively correlated with the
level of G.  The impact of taxes on output growth rates is negative
in some studies, but not significantly different from zero in
others.
V.  Conclusion
Economists have stressed that the efficiency costs of taxation
are  not  the obvious  costs  --  to taxpayers  --  of handing  over
16When coefficients differ across countries het=roscedasticity
results.  The OLS estimate of the average coefficient  value
across countries will be unbiased, although the standard errors
will be biased (Engen  and Skinner, 1988).54
payments to the government.  Instead, the efficiency costs stem from
the efforts of taxpayers to avoid paying money to the government,
whether it is consuming less of the taxed good, producing less of
the taxed good, smuggling, or just evading taxes.  The purpose of
this paper has been to illustrate with historical and more recent
examples the efficiency costs of taxation.  Each type of tax (labor,
capital, property) was shown to have particular disincentive
effects, which, if the tax rates were sufficiently high, could be
dramatic.  In other cases, the impact  of taxation was less clear; in
particular, the effectiveness of investment tax incentives (which
reduce the tax on business investment) is not well established.
A second approach for testirg how taxes affect economic
activity is to examine whether countries with different tax
structures grow at different rates.  That is, do we find that,
conditioning on other factors such as investment growth, government
expenditures, and population, do countries with high tax rates (;r  w
faster or slower than countries with low tax rates.  Of course,  'Iii;
type of analysis must be interpreted  with caution, owing to the
difficulties in cross-country comparisons.
In conclusion, the efficiency cost of taxation is often
difficult to detect, and often takes a back seat to political
considerations in tax policy.  It is true that when tax rates ar.a
low, they may have little impact on economic behavior, and as a
consequence entail little  efficiency cost.  When tax rates are
extremely high, even the most economically ignorant  observer notes
the large efficiency costs of the tax.  It is when taxes are- 55
uoderately distorting, and the effects, though substantial, are
difficult to detect, that taxes have the greatest potential for
damage.56
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